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The implication of spontaneous and induced unhappiness to people’s decision style is
examined. It is postulated that unhappy individuals have a greater tendency to avoid
frequent losses because these can have depleting effects, and unhappy individuals
are more sensitive to such effects. This is evaluated in Study 1 by using an annoying
customer call manipulation to induce negative affect; and by examining the effect of this
manipulation on choices in an experiential decision task (the Iowa Gambling task). In
Study 2 we examined the association between self-reported (un)happiness and choices
on the same decision task. In Study 1 the induction of negative affect led to avoidance
of choice alternatives with frequent losses, compared to those yielding rarer but larger
losses. Specifically, this pertained to the advantageous alternatives with frequent vs.
non-frequent losses. In Study 2 unhappiness was similarly associated with less exposure
to frequent losses; while extreme high happiness was associated with no tendency to
avoid frequent losses when these were part of an advantageous alternative. The findings
clarify the role of happiness in decision making processes by indicating that unhappiness
induces sensitivity to the frequency rather than to the total effect of negative events.
Keywords: decisions from experience, happiness, rare events, individual differences, emotions
INTRODUCTION
Positive-psychology theories of well-being and happiness often take an Aristotelian approach,
in which happiness is the product of the pursuit for meaning in a person’s life (Seligman and
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). In Aristotle’s words “Happiness is the meaning and the purpose of life,
the whole aim and end of human existence” (Aristotle, 2000). Consequently, these theories focus
on variables such as moments of highly positive experiences at work (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi,
1990), people’s relation to their work (Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001), the availability of time
for personally significant activities (Perlow, 1999), and the fit between personal goals and one’s
personality (Kasser and Ahuvia, 2002). However, a much earlier Greek philosopher, Epicurus, had
a different view on what makes people happy. He argued that well-being is simply the product
of not-suffering (De Witt, 1964). In other words, happiness is the result of the absence of mental
and physical pain. This concept resonates in modern Psychology as well, extending into Freud’s
pleasure principle (Freud, 1930) and being succinct in modern theories of motivation (e.g., Gray,
1994; Higgins, 1997). The current study assesses whether indeed people who are relatively unhappy
have a different way of dealing with negative repercussions (i.e., penalties) than those in a happier
state of mind. Specifically, we take a neo-epicurean approach that happiness is associated with better
capacity to emotionally withstand continuous negative repercussions; and unhappiness leads to the
reverse trend. Consequently, unhappy people tend to avoid small frequent penalties.
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Previous findings have shown that people who are relatively
unhappy have lower pain thresholds, and thus tend to avoid
painful experiences to a greater extent. For instance, experimental
studies demonstrated that a negative mood induced by imagery
decreased pain tolerance while an elated mood increased pain
tolerance (Hertel and Hekmat, 1994; Weisenberg et al., 1998;
Tang et al., 2008). Similarly, people reporting more negative
affectivity indicated more subjective distress as a result of pain
experiences (Rhudy and Meagher, 2001; Zautra et al., 2005;
Connelly et al., 2007). Finally, there is evidence of an association
between the clinical diagnosis of major depression and the
syndrome of chronic pain (Fishbain et al., 1986; Haythornwaite
et al., 1991; Carroll et al., 2004). These findings suggest that
unhappy individuals have lower capacity to withstand pain.
However, in studies of decision making the induction of
negative affect using a variety of methods was found to increase
the tendency to select risky alternatives producing gains and
losses (e.g., Kuvaas and Kaufmann, 2004; Suhr and Tsanadis,
2006; Chuang and Lin, 2007). Similarly, adults and children with
negative affectivity were typically found to exhibit more risk
taking (e.g., Desrichard and Denarié, 2005; Garon and Moore,
2006; Sundqvist and Wennberg, 2015). Both sets of findings
suggest that unhappy people are less sensitive to financial losses.
A consistent finding emerges in studies focusing on the induction
of positive affect, which demonstrated that happy people are
more sensitive to financial losses (Isen and Patrick, 1983; Isen
et al., 1988)1. Thus, one might conclude that relatively unhappy
individuals show decreased, rather than increased, sensitivity to
the psychological agitation inflicted by financial losses.
The current paper attempts to reconcile this apparent
inconsistency by suggesting that the cognitive construct linked
with unhappiness is not the sensitivity to the size of the loss, but
rather the capacity to withstand frequent penalties. Pain tolerance
studies examine the ability to withstand continuous pain in order
to get a (formal or informal) reward at the end of the task. This
experimental situation thus offers a tradeoff between frequent
penalties as a result of the mounting pain and a one-time loss
of one’s (formal or informal) reward. We suggest that if decision
tasks are similarly constructed, then unhappy individuals would
avoid alternatives producing frequent losses.
Our predictions are consistent with previous findings showing
that people with negative affect are more sensitive to depleting
environmental consequences (Baumeister et al., 1998). The
frequency of the negative event seems to be an important factor
in the depletion process. For example, small frequent hassles were
found to contribute more to people’s stress and burnout than
large life events (Lazarus et al., 1985; Zohar, 1997). Possibly,
even minor financial losses have depleting effects when they
are frequent. Indeed, in laboratory studies, people were found
to weigh in the frequency of outcomes much more than their
magnitude (Barron and Erev, 2003; Yechiam and Busemeyer,
2006; Camilleri and Newell, 2011). We posited that happy
individuals would better tolerate the exposure to frequent losses;
1This pattern was obtained with descriptive lotteries, and hence it is usually
explained by the idea that people who are feeling relatively happy are more
motivated to maintain their current state and thus may have more to lose by taking
risk than unhappier individuals (e.g., Isen and Simmonds, 1978).
particularly if these lead to a net (accumulated) advantage in
terms of one’s outcomes, while unhappy individuals would tend
to avoid frequent losses even in the latter circumstance because
of their greater sensitivity to depleting factors.
Study 1 focused on experimentally induced negative affect, by
means of an annoying customer call in a call-center simulation
(c.f., Miron-Spektor and Rafaeli, 2009). Past research has shown
that this protocol leads to a variety of negative emotions,
particularly significant anger, and frustration (Miron-Spektor
and Rafaeli, 2009), but also unpleasantness and stress (Gabay,
2008). It therefore appears that this manipulation is conducive to
a state of negative well-being. In Study 2 we examined individual
differences in unhappiness.
The dependent variable in both studies was the choice of
alternatives yielding frequent as compared to rare losses. This was
examined in the four-alternative Iowa Gambling task (Bechara
et al., 1994), which manipulates in addition to the frequency of
losses, the advantageousness of the choice alternative, allowing to
examine the interaction between these factors.
STUDY 1
Half of the participants heard a conversation between a
customer service representative and an extremely dissatisfied
and rude customer (Annoyance condition); the others heard
a conversation that was identical in all other respects except
that the customer expressed no particular emotion (Control
condition). In the Annoyance condition the customer seemed
hostile, nasty and critical; in the Control condition the customer
was pragmatic with no clear sentiment. Additionally, following
the annoying customer call participants reported their felt
emotions (following Watson et al., 1988) as a manipulation
check.
The main dependent variable was a novel index in the Iowa
Gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994). The task involves repeated
selections between four alternatives, whose outcomes are drawn
from the fixed payoff distributions appearing in Table 1. We
examined the choices from the two alternatives yielding frequent
(50%) compared to infrequent (10%) losses. Across alternatives,
the frequent loss alternatives (Loss50, DisLoss50) have the exact
same expected value as their counterparts with less frequent
losses (Loss10, DisLoss10). It was expected that individuals
induced to be unhappy would demonstrate greater avoidance of
the two frequent-loss options.
We also separately examined the frequent and less frequent
loss options within each pair of advantageous alternatives
(Loss50 vs. Loss10) and disadvantageous alternatives (DisLoss50
TABLE 1 | Outcome distributions for the choice alternatives of the Iowa
Gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994).
Alternative Gains (tokens) Losses (tokens) EV
Loss50 50 every time 50% chance of losing 50 25
Loss10 50 every time 10% chance of losing 250 25
DisLoss50 100 every time 50% chance of losing 250 −25
DisLoss10 100 every time 10% chance of losing 1250 −25
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vs. DisLoss10). Again, within each pair the frequent and
infrequent loss options have identical expected values. It
was predicted that induced unhappiness would be associated
particularly with the tendency to avoid the advantageous
alternative with frequent minor losses compared to its
counterpart with infrequent larger losses. In this case, exposure
to frequent losses may be undertaken for the purpose of
maintaining selections leading to net profit by individuals
in the Control condition but less so by those induced to be
unhappy. However, a contrasting prediction is that if one is
selecting disadvantageously, then one values the disadvantageous
alternatives more; and in this case within disadvantageous
alternatives as well unhappiness should be associated with
selection of the option with less frequent losses.
Additionally, for a subset of the participants we examined the
degree of arousal during the task. Pupil diameter was used as
a measure of arousal since it is considered an immediate and
direct index of autonomic activation, which modulates cognitive
and emotional processes (Andreassi, 2000; Bradley et al., 2008).
We expected higher arousal in the Annoyance condition in
line with the well-known relation between emotion and arousal
(Routtenberg, 1968; Lindsley, 1970).
Method
Participants
One-hundred and twenty undergraduate students (60 men and
60 women) participated in the study. We aimed for about
120 participants to provide sufficient power to detect small-
to-medium sized effects. The participants’ average age was 24
(ranging between 19 and 32). The data of two individuals was
corrupted and they were removed from the analysis (leaving
a total of 118). Participants were randomly assigned into the
two experimental conditions, keeping an equal number of
participants and gender proportions in each condition. Half
of the participants performed the task with no physiological
measures and half with the eye tracker (we refer to these two
subsets as the Behavioral group and the Eye tracking group).
The former received a basic fee of NIS 20 and additionally a
performance-based stipend. The latter group received a basic
fee of NIS 40 due to the longer procedure (which included
calibration).
Study Conditions
The initial instructions that all participants received were as
follows: “This experiment simulates a customer service center.
As a Customer Service Representative you will be asked to
perform several tasks, and will be compensated based on
your performance. You will be asked to listen to a recorded
conversation between a customer and another Customer Service
Representative in your center, and then to freely recall it.
Additionally, you will be asked to perform an unrelated decision-
making task and respond to a short survey.” All participants
listened to a pre-recorded conversation using headphones, which
was different in the Annoyance and Control condition (see
Figure 1).
The conversations in the calls were taken from transcripts
of real customer service interactions in a local cellular provider
(Miron-Spektor and Rafaeli, 2009). The problem reported by the
customer was identical in both conditions, although the text was
modified and included either negative expressions (Annoyance
condition) or neutral ones (Control condition). Since anger is
better recognized when expressed by males than females (Goos
and Silverman, 2002), the customer in both conversations was a
male and the service provider was a female.
Measures
Iowa Gambling Task
A computerized version of the task devised by Bechara et al.
(1994) was employed (see also Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2005).
In this task, the participant sees four decks of cards, labeled
A, B, C, and D, on a computer screen. Using the mouse,
the participant repeatedly selects cards from any of the four
decks. The amounts won and lost are displayed on the
selected deck (see Table 1). The major dependent variable
was the proportion of selection from the two alternatives
yielding frequent losses (Loss50 + DisLoss50). As a secondary
examination, we studied the difference between the proportion
of selections from the alternatives with frequent or infrequent
losses within the advantageous alternatives (Loss50 − Loss10)
and disadvantageous (DisLoss50 − DisLoss10) alternatives. The
original task instructions (Bechara et al., 1994) were used. Briefly,
participants were not given prior information about the choice
outcomes. To increase participants’ motivation actual monetary
amounts were used. Participants were told that every 100 points
they win or lose would be converted to actual payments of 1 new
Israeli Shekel. For the participants in the Behavioral group the
task included 100 trials while for those in the Eye tracking group
the task was shortened to 60 trials2.
Felt Emotions
After hearing the conversation, participants were asked to
indicate the extent to which to which they felt positive or
negative emotions right now. A list of emotions was drawn
from the PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988). Following Harmon-
Jones et al. (2009), the list included the three emotions: “angry,”
“frustrated,” and “tranquil.” Additionally, for half the subjects
we added the terms: “unpleasant,” “enthusiastic,” “attentive,”
“stressed,” and “interested,” and for the remaining half we
added the terms “energetic,” “exhausted,” “drowsy,” and “vibrant.”
Questions were presented in a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very
slightly or not at all to 5 = extremely). For the three affects
that were administered to all subjects we created a single index
of negative affect (reverse scoring the positive affect). The
Cronbach’s Alpha for this index was adequate (α= 0.72).
Pupil Diameter
Pupil diameter was assessed as a measure of arousal. Eye-tracking
data was collected using ViewPoint PC 60 EyeFrame system
(Arrington Research, Scottsdale, Arizona). The system operates
with a single tiny camera and an infrared illuminator aimed at
the participant’s dominant eye, and supported by comfortable
head straps. It records pupil data at approximately 30 frames per
second. Pupil data was measured as the diameter of the pupil
2This was due to a technical difference between the versions used in two labs.
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FIGURE 1 | Annoying vs. neutral conversations used in Study 1.
during the customer-call. We also studied as a baseline measure
the pupil diameter just after the calibration and prior to the start
of the customer-call for a period of 30 s. During this time the
participants were asked to look at the center of the screen and
wait for the experimenter’s instructions.
Procedure
Those in the Eye tracking group first put on the eye tracker
glasses, and the device was synchronized. From this point on the
procedure was identical for both subgroups. Next, all participants
listened to a pre-recorded conversation using headphones, which
was the only difference between the Annoyance and Control
condition (see Figure 1). They then reported their felt emotions,
completed the Iowa Gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994), and
performed a memory task that probed the contents of the
conversation (for conciseness we do not report the results from
this task). Participants were rewarded for correct recall of details
in thememory task and for their selections on the Iowa Gambling
task.
Analysis
We conducted a manipulation check by examining the difference
between conditions in felt emotions and pupil diameter.
This was followed by an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
examining the effect of condition (Annoyance and Control)
and group (eye tracking vs. behavioral) on the rate of selection
from alternatives with high-frequency losses in the Iowa
Gambling task. Next, we separately examined the selection
of advantageous and disadvantageous alternatives producing
high-frequency losses. We then examined the effect of these
factors on the rate of disadvantageous selections, for control
purposes.
Results and Discussion
Felt Emotions
Overall, participants reported more negative affect following the
annoyance manipulation compared to the Control condition
[t(116) = 3.53, p < 0.001]. In particular, in the Annoyance
condition participants reported more anger [t(116) = 3.78, p <
0.001] and more frustration [t(116) = 3.10, p = 0.002], as well as
greater unpleasantness [t(58) = 3.06, p = 0.002], and more stress
[t(58) = 2.10, p = 0.04]. Interestingly, lower and non-significant
effects were registered for the positive emotions (e.g., calmness;
p= 0.12; enthusiasm: p= 0.82).
Pupil Diameter
Prior to the start of the customer-call there was no significant
difference in pupil diameter between the Annoyance and Control
condition [t(56) = 1.53, p = 0.16]. However, during the
conversation pupil diameter in the Annoyance condition was
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significantly larger [t(56) = 3.31, p= 0.001], denoting an increase
in arousal as a result of hearing its narrative.
Decision Task
Participants’ learning curves on the Iowa Gambling task
appear in Figure 2. As can be seen, on average they show
the typical pattern of learning to select advantageously with
repeated choices (as in Bechara et al., 1994). The proportions
of selections from each alternative appear in Table 2. Across
conditions and groups, alternatives with high-frequency losses
were chosen less than those with infrequent losses. Alternative
Loss50 was selected 21.8% of the time, compared to 31.4%
selections of its advantageous counterpart, Loss10 [t(129) =
3.73, p < 0.001]. Alternative DisLoss50 was selected only
16.3% of the time, compared to 30.5% for DisLoss10 [t(129)
= 8.12, p < 0.001]. We next examined the difference
in choice behavior between the Annoyance and Control
condition.
The results (presented in Table 2 and left panes of Figure 2)
showed a difference in the predicted direction. In both groups,
participants in the Annoyance condition made fewer choices
from the two frequent-loss alternatives (Loss50 + DisLoss50:
33.8% compared to 42.5%). An ANOVA showed that the effect
of condition was significant [F(1, 114) = 8.21, p= 0.005] while the
effect of group (Behavioral vs. Eye tracking) and the interaction
of group and condition were not significant, F(1, 114) = 2.07, p =
0.15; F(1, 114) = 0.13, p= 0.72. Thus, the negative affect induction
resulted in less exposure to frequent losses.
We then proceeded into examining the advantageous
and disadvantageous alternatives separately. The difference
between conditions in relative selection from each of the two
advantageous alternatives (Loss50 − Loss10) was significant in
FIGURE 2 | Study 1 results. Top: Results for participants in the Behavioral group. Bottom: Results for participants in the Eye tracking group. Left: Rate of selection
from the two disadvantageous alternatives (DisLoss10 + DisLoss50) and from the two alternatives with frequent losses (Loss50 + DisLoss50) in the two experimental
conditions (Annoyance and Control) across trials. Error terms denote confidence intervals. Right: Choices from the disadvantageous alternatives in four blocks of trials
in the two experimental conditions.
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TABLE 2 | Choices in Study 1 for the participants in the Behavioral and
Eye tracking groups: Averages and standard errors of selections from
each alternative, in percents.
Loss50 Loss10 DisLoss50 DisLoss10
BEHAVIORAL GROUP
Annoyance 21.0 ± 3.1 38.1 ± 3.8 14.4 ± 1.4 26.5 ± 3.0
Control 27.7 ± 4.0 28.8 ± 3.8 17.5 ± 3.2 25.9 ± 2.8
EYE TRACKING GROUP
Annoyance 16.9 ± 1.0 32.3 ± 1.4 14.9 ± 0.5 35.0 ± 1.5
Control 21.3 ± 1.7 25.8 ± 1.2 18.5 ± 0.8 34.4 ± 1.7
an ANOVA, F(1, 114) = 7.01, p = 0.009, denoting a decreased
tendency to select the frequent-loss alternative Loss50 compared
to its advantageous counter-part Loss10 (which produces less
frequent losses) for participants in the Annoyance condition.
The effect of group (Behavioral vs. Eye tracking) and the
interaction between group and condition, were not significant,
F(1, 114) = 0.03, p= 0.86; F(1, 114) = 0.25, p= 0.62.
Such differences were not found for relative selection from the
high and low- frequency disadvantageous alternatives, DisLoss50
− DisLoss10: [F(1, 114) = 1.40, p = 0.24] and also not for the two
disadvantageous alternatives together, DisLoss50 + DisLoss10:
[F(1, 114) = 0.48, p = 0.49]; suggesting that the manipulation
specifically affected the exposure to frequent losses when they
were advantageous.
We next examined whether participants’ emotions can predict
their avoidance of frequent losses. In this analysis we focused
on the index for avoiding rare losses in advantageous selections
(Loss50 − Loss10). As previously, the analysis was conducted
separately for the two groups (Behavioral, Eye tracking). For
the Behavioral group negative affect was negatively correlated
with the Loss50 − Loss10 index (r = −0.26, p = 0.05)3, but
such was not the case for the Eye tracking group (r = 0.19,
p = 0.15) and across groups the effect was not significant.
Given that participants only evaluated their emotions following
the affective manipulation, individual differences in reported
emotions represent a mixture of tonic and induction-specific
effects, the interaction of which may have confounded the
association with decision behavior. We therefore proceeded to
examine the association between unhappiness and sensitivity to
frequent losses with no affect induction.
STUDY 2
In our next study we examined the association between self-
reported (un)happiness and behavioral choices on the Iowa
Gambling task. Our prediction was that negative well-being
would be associated with a lower tendency to be exposed
to frequent losses, particularly in advantageous alternatives
(yielding greater avoidance of alternative Loss50 relative to
Loss10).
3From the three affects indexed, the highest correlation was with anger, r =−0.27,
p= 0.04; the lowest with frustration, r =−0.20, p= 0.14.
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty undergraduate students (65 men and
65 women) participated in the study. We aimed for about
120 participants to provide sufficient power to detect small-to-
medium sized effects and used all those showing up without
excluding any participant. The participants’ average age was 23.5
(ranging between 18 and 28). Their basic fee was NIS 20 and a
performance-based stipend.
Procedure
We administered the Iowa Gambling task (Bechara et al.,
1994) using the same instructions as in the previous study.
Following the task participants completed the Oxford Happiness
Questionnaire—Shortened version (Hills and Argyle, 2002). This
questionnaire has 10 items with sample questions being “I feel
that life is very rewarding” and “I don’t feel particularly pleased
with the way I am” (reversed-scored)4. It is answered on a six-
point Likert scale ranging from “agree strongly” (1) to “disagree
strongly” (6). Three items are reversed scored. Scores range from
8 to 48, with higher scores on the scale indicating a greater level
of happiness. As the responses were negatively skewed, and given
the sensitivity of Cronbach’s Alpha to skewed results (Dunlap
et al., 1994), we examined reliability using log transformed scores.
The inter-item reliability was adequate (α= 0.84).
Analysis
Our main analysis examined the association between self-
reported happiness on the Oxford Happiness Questionnaire and
the rate of selection from the alternatives with high-frequency
losses in the Iowa Gambling task. Again, this was followed by the
separate examination of disadvantageous and disadvantageous
alternatives with high-frequency losses. For comparison, we
also examined the association with the rate of disadvantageous
selections. All analyses were conducted using Pearson correlation
but were replicated using Spearman’s rank order correlation.
Results and Discussion
As previously, alternatives with high-frequency losses were
chosen less than those with infrequent losses. Alternative Loss50
was selected 26.3% of the time, compared to 34.4% selections
of Loss10 [t(129) = 2.52, p = 0.01]. Alternative DisLoss50 was
selected only 12.5% of the time, compared to 26.3% for DisLoss10
[t(129) = 10.91, p < 0.001].
Figure 3 top panel shows a scatter plot of the relation between
self-reported happiness and the rate of selection from the two
alternatives with high frequency negative outcomes (Loss50
+ DisLoss50). The correlation between these two indices was
positive and significant, r = 0.31, p < 0.001, marking a tendency
of low happiness individuals to avoid high frequency losses.
Additionally, as shown in Figure 3 bottom panel, the association
between happiness ratings and the Loss50 − Loss10 index was
significant, r = 0.30, p < 0.001. Both correlations were replicated
using Spearman’s rho: Happiness with Loss50 + DisLoss50, r =
4The questionnaire was administered after the Iowa Gambling task. Thus, across
studies the design is counter-balanced for the order of the task and the reporting
of emotional state.
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FIGURE 3 | Study 2 results. A scatter point of the relation between
self-reported well-being on the Oxford Happiness Scale (Hills and Argyle,
2002) and choice behavior. Top: Association with rate of selections from the
two alternatives with frequent losses (Loss50 + DisLoss50). Bottom:
Association with relative choices from alternatives Loss50 and Loss10 (Loss50
− Loss10). The trend-lines represent the results of a linear regression between
the two variables.
0.34, p < 0.001; and with Loss50 − Loss10, r = 0.25, p = 0.004.
Thus, relatively unhappy individuals specifically tended to avoid
the advantageous option producing high-frequency losses, and
preferred the alternative with lower frequency losses. By contrast,
happiness ratings were not associated with relative selection
from the disadvantageous alternative producing high-frequency
losses compared to its counter-part (DisLoss50 − DisLoss10),
r = 0.13, p = 0.13. The results also revealed no significant
correlation between happiness ratings and the combined score of
disadvantageous selections (DisLoss50 + DisLoss10), r = 0.08,
p= 0.39.
The current results are consistent with our prediction that
unhappy individuals tend to avoid high-frequency losses, while
happy individuals allow themselves to be exposed to these losses
when this is advantageous. Indeed, as indicated in Figure 3
bottom panel, from a certain level of happiness (a score of 42
and above on the Oxford Happiness Questionnaire; representing
about 28% of the sample) individuals no longer avoided the
frequent-loss advantageous alternative compared to its counter-
part with infrequent losses.
DISCUSSION
In Study 1 the communicated emotional expressions of another
person were used as a powerful inducer of negative affect
(following Kopelman et al., 2006). The results of this study
showed that an annoying customer call in a customer-service
simulation (Miron-Spektor and Rafaeli, 2009) increased the
avoidance of alternatives producing minor but frequent losses.
Thus, the annoyance manipulation led to increased sensitivity to
the frequency and not to the size of the losses. In Study 2 we find
similar results for individual differences: Individuals who self-
rated as relatively unhappy avoided alternatives producing minor
but frequent losses and opted for ones producing larger but rarer
losses. This finding suggests that the relation between happiness
and the exposure to frequent losses occurs irrespectively of a
particular affect induction technique.
In both studies, the effect was stronger for advantageous
alternatives, and it was not statistically significant within
disadvantageous alternatives. One possible reason for this
interaction is that happier individuals were willing to tolerate
frequent losses if they led to positive net outcomes over
repeated selections, but not otherwise. By contrast, for unhappier
individuals this willingness to tolerate frequent losses for a
purpose was compromised.
Our results do leave some ambiguity with regards to the
specific affect associated with avoidance of frequent losses.
Our correlational analysis in Study 1 indicated a significant
association between negative affect and the avoidance of frequent
losses in one of the studied groups but not in the other, while
examination of specific items showed that different negative
emotions led to similar associations with the avoidance of
frequent losses, thus suggesting that further research should
be conducted to identify the specific emotions modulating the
avoidance of rare losses. For instance, though our manipulation
led to several negative emotions, we did not study the effect of fear
emotions which seems to arouse a unique pattern of risk aversion
(Lerner and Keltner, 2001). Furthermore, the specific processes
leading to the sensitivity to frequent losses could be investigated
further. For instance, one could differentiate the sensitivity to
the frequency of losses per se or from a recency effect whereby
one is more affected by the most recent outcomes (which in the
case of an alternative with frequent losses tend to be negative).
Still, it does not seem likely that the current result are driven
by a mere recency effect (independently of gaining and losing)
because this would imply an association between (un)happiness
and disadvantageous selection in the Iowa Gambling task (see
Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2005); such an association was not
found in the present study.
The current results shed light on the apparent paradox that
unhappy individuals have lower pain tolerance (e.g., Hertel and
Hekmat, 1994; Weisenberg et al., 1998; Tang et al., 2008) while
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exhibiting more risk taking in laboratory tasks involving losses.
The former finding can be interpreted as higher sensitivity to
negative stimuli on the part of unhappy individuals, while the
latter can be interpreted as lower sensitivity to them. We have
shown that when a decision task includes an alternative with
frequent losses, unhappy individuals are less willing to be exposed
to these losses and prefer instead to receive less frequent but
larger losses.
Another contribution of our study is in finding a boundary
condition for the increased weighting of frequent compared
to rare events (also known as the underweighting of rare
events; Barron and Erev, 2003; Rakow and Newell, 2010; Di
Guida et al., 2015). In both studies, the tendency to avoid
advantageous frequent losses was curbed by (relative) positive
affect and well-being. Most striking was the finding that high-
happiness individuals no longer opted for rare large penalties
over frequent penalties, thus showing no underweighting of rare
events. We therefore suggest that affective depletion may be one
of the mechanisms leading to preference of rare over common
penalties. By affective depletion we refer to emotional exhaustion
which typically results from repeated negative experiences
(Wright and Cropanzano, 1998)5. The notion that affective
depletion contributes to the underweighting of rare events is
consistent with the findings that underweighting of rare events
is smaller in the gain domain where there are no depleting losses
(e.g., Barron and Erev, 2003).
A common modern view concerning emotions is that they
can both improve and impair decision making (e.g., Shiv et al.,
2005; Baumeister et al., 2007; Loewenstein, 2010). For example,
research has shown that individuals with lesioned ventromedial
frontal cortices that have difficulties associating their emotions
with anticipated consequences of their actions, display excessive
risk taking and perform poorly in the Iowa Gambling task
(Bechara et al., 1994). Yet subsequent research has shown that if
the task is changed so that the risky alternatives are advantageous
the same frontal lesioned individuals perform better than healthy
controls (Shiv et al., 2005). Nevertheless, even proponents of the
argument that emotions can both improve and impair decision
making often suggest a deleterious role for current emotions,
as opposed to anticipated emotions marking one’s emotional
perception (Baumeister et al., 2007). By contrast, in the present
study the avoidance of frequent losses was independent of
people’s risk taking or advantageous selection. For example, in
all study conditions our findings show the typical pattern of
moving from disadvantageous to advantageous selection in the
Iowa Gambling task. Thus, we find that current emotions did
not have a negative effect on task performance. This suggests that
as for anticipated emotional consequences, current emotions can
predispose individuals to select certain types of incentives, but the
advantageousness of these incentive structures seems to depend
on the relevant task characteristics.
5Most typically, affective depletion has been studied in job settings where
frequency is defined in resolution of days (e.g., Lazarus et al., 1985; Zohar, 1997;
Wheeler et al., 2013) with findings showing that it is associated with stress, burnout,
and somatic symptoms. However, we suggest that emotionally depleting effects of
repeated negative experiences also emerge in a small scale when negative outcomes
are presented over and over again within a short time.
Additionally, current emotionsmay have counteracting effects
on the ability to pay attention and allocate cognitive resources.
On the one hand, as suggested by Baumeister et al. (2007)
negative emotions toward an external object (e.g., anger) may
take away the focus from tasks conducted following this emotion.
Attention may wander to the prior negative experience, or to
self-related thoughts (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989), which may
reduce on-task attention, and consequently impair cognitive
scrutiny and performance. On the other hand, negative affective
reactions may also increase the overall attentional pool (Taylor,
1991) and this can lead to improved performance in subsequent
tasks. For instance, financial losses experienced during a decision
task were found to lead to more advantageous decisions in an
unrelated task performed in subsequent trials (Yechiam and
Hochman, 2013). Thus, the relation between negative emotions
and cognitive effort may be more complicated than previously
suggested, and could depend on moderators such as one’s current
pool of attention, and the degree to which one treats subsequent
experience following a negative affect as part of a general context
warranting attention6. The examination of such moderators is an
interesting question for subsequent research.
CONCLUSIONS
The current findings show that performance in a basic
task of choosing between reinforcements is affected by one’s
happiness. As opposed to previous studies, we highlighted the
role of the frequency of negative reinforcements. In our two
studies relatively unhappy individuals preferred to accept high
magnitude losses compared to high frequency losses of the same
overall expected value. These findings suggest a psychological
moderator to the well-known phenomenon whereby people are
sensitive to recurring losses and prefer receiving larger to more
frequent ones. This tendency is aggravated under conditions of
duress, but is reduced for individuals reporting high positive
well-being.
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may mind wander about the prior negative event, which could take her focus away
from the upcoming call.
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